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Abstract: This paper critically discusses the dynamics of public debt, both domestic and foreign, in Zambia and 
how it has influenced the economy’s growth process over the period from 1964 to 2015. The structural and 
institutional reforms as well as the legal and public finance administrative frameworks that shaped the level, 
structure, and composition of public debt stock in Zambia over the review period were highlighted in the paper. 
Two distinct episodes of public debt were identified.  The first phase is from 1980 to 2004, in which public debt 
surpassed gross domestic product. The second phase is from 2005 to 2015, in which public debt-GDP ratio was 
on a declining path following the implementation of public debt relief initiatives and a boom in economic 
activities. Although Zambia’s government debt is currently sustainable according to International Monetary 
Fund/World Bank indicative thresholds, the country, like many other lower middle-income countries, is still 
experiencing some debt management challenges emanating from weak debt institutional frameworks. The study, 
therefore, recommends that the government: (1) limits both domestic and foreign borrowing to reduce high 
interest payments on debt in future; (2) aligns its infrastructure expenditures with domestic revenues to ensure 
budget sustainability; (3) implements and adheres to cash budgeting system to control fiscal deficits; and (4) 
expands its domestic revenue base by diversifying the economy and promoting massive industrialisation. 
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1. Introduction 
In theoretical literature, varying perceptions exist on the nature of the relationship between domestic and 
foreign public debt and economic growth. First is the view that large public debt is bad, owing to its 
crushing burden on taxpayers and the need for the government to create new money to service it (Lipsey 
et al., 1963, p. 389). This view is augmented by the fiscal conservative and classical perspectives of the 
18th Century, which support a balanced fiscal budget to avoid inevitable future economic downturns 
(Blanchard, 2002). The conservatives and classicalists posit that government spending by politicians is 
mostly wasteful, leading to unrelenting public sector indebtedness and depressed economic growth rates 
(Hume in Holtfrerich, 2013). Second is the opposing Keynesian perspective, which views domestic and 
foreign public debt as a critical tool that most governments use to ensure full employment. Third is the 
Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH), which supports the nonexistence of an economic relationship 
between public debt and growth (Barro, 1974; Churchman, 2001). According to the Ricardian school of 
thought, government debt has no real impact on the optimisation behaviour of the private sector (Barro, 
1989). 
Empirically, separate studies by De Grauwe (2011) and Ramey and Ramey in Panizza and Presbitero 
(2013) show that high public debt poses some constraints on national growth by limiting a country’s 
policy space. Nevertheless, Panizza and Presbitero (2012) argue that the correlation between public debt 
and economic growth does not imply causation. Furthermore, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) modelled the 
neutrality of high government debt to gross domestic product (GDP), citing Japan, where the public debt 
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to GDP ratio exceeds 150% but is not hampering the country’s economic growth process, as an 
example.  
Accordingly, the public debt-growth nexus is more complex than generally perceived and is potentially 
influenced by innumerable other unobserved factors across countries. The study of the public debt-
growth relationship is thus important since it explains the ability of fiscal policy and monetary policy in 
influencing economic activities. Furthermore, since studies of this nature have not been able to afford 
satisfactory coverage to Zambia, extending the public debt-growth nexus study to the Zambian economy 
is indispensable – given the country’s debt levels that are continuously growing and the debt 
composition and structure that is also changing. 
Against this background, the objective of this study is to analyse the evolution of the public and publicly 
guaranteed debt stock in Zambia. The study highlights the debt reforms, trends, and challenges from 
1964 to 2015 in Zambia. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses public debt 
reforms in Zambia; Section 3 examines trends in public debt in Zambia; Section 4 discusses the 
challenges facing public debt management in Zambia; and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Public Debt Reforms in Zambia 
Between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s, most African economies, Zambia included, embraced a 
chain of structural adjustment programmes intended to stimulate economic growth through increased 
investment levels and reduced government overall indebtedness. Nonetheless, economic growth rates 
remained subdued due to poor investment response, essentially owing to the high investment risks 
associated with most Africa States (Andersson et al., 2000). Thus, Zambia’s profound public 
indebtedness since the early 1970s originated mainly from natural factors (such as periodic and 
devastating droughts), declining terms of trade for commodity exports, poor gross investment levels, 
massive infrastructural developments, public sector financial indiscipline, and increasing social 
demands. According to Andersson et al., (2000, p. 30), the poor performance of the Zambian economy 
between 1973 and 2000 caused severe state revenue constraints, forcing the government to rely on 
seigniorage, domestic and foreign borrowing (mainly non-concessional), and on excessive rundown on 
export earnings at the country’s central bank in order to increase fiscal space. Furthermore, the inability 
by the country to adequately service foreign public debt led to interest on debt accruals, prompting 
government debt stock to continue trending upwards in the 1980s, even after new borrowings had 
ceased (World Bank, 1993, p. 15). Consequently, by 1980, Zambia was in a serious debt crisis, which 
subsequently led to a series of public debt reforms. Some of the reforms were well designed, while some 
were not. Overall, public debt reforms in Zambia have centred on improving the legal, institutional, and 
public financial management frameworks of the country. In 2001, Zambia’s cumulative public debt 
exceeded 235% of gross domestic product (GDP), relative to a public debt/GDP ratio of 44% recorded 
in 1970 (International Monetary Fund “IMF”, 2008; World Bank, 2012). 
The sluggish economic growth that characterised the Zambian economy after 1973 compelled the 
government to implement economic and financial reforms aimed at strengthening budget cycle 
processes and procedures, with the ultimate goal of curtailing rising public debt levels (Chirwa & 
Odhiambo, 2016; World Bank, 1993, p.  2). Basically, the debt reforms in Zambia can be put into two 
distinct periods – 1980 to 2005 and 2006 to 2015. The first category, 1980 to 2005, was characterised by 
the government’s stringent reforms aimed at reducing the debt burden (United Nations Development 
Programme “UNDP”, 2016); while the second category, 2006 to 2015, was associated with reforms that 
focussed more on maintaining public debt within sustainable levels (Bank of Zambia “BOZ”, 2015a).  
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Between 1988 and 1994, Zambia’s average annual domestic revenue was around 17% of GDP, a level 
which was insufficient to meet the government’s recurrent expenditure demands and also inadequate to 
reduce the country’s over-reliance on domestic and foreign borrowing (World Bank, 2007). Thus, the 
major domestic public debt management reforms undertaken by the government of Zambia in the 1990s 
were aimed at boosting the revenue capacity of the government and restricting fiscal deficits. These 
reforms included: (1) adoption of a cash budgeting system; (2) introduction of value-added tax; (3) 
implementation of new government securities trading arrangements, and (4) revision of the country’s 
foreign exchange laws (BOZ, 2006; GRZ, 2006; World Bank, 1993; 2001; 2017).  
The introduction of a cash budget system in 1993 limited government ministries’ expenditures to 
disbursed funds only (Government of the Republic of Zambia “GRZ”, 2007). In 1993, the government 
introduced a new treasury bill tender system called the auction system, to “deepen the domestic capital, 
money and foreign exchange markets”, in addition to mopping up excess liquidity (BOZ, 2015: 10). 
This exercise caused a swift upsurge in nominal interest rates from approximately 60% in September 
1992 to over 200% by the end of 1993 (World Bank, 2001). The liberalisation of the treasury bill and 
the government bond markets meant that the prices of these securities were to be determined by market 
forces. Through the Foreign Exchange Control Act of 1994 and the re-introduction of the auction 
system of treasury bills in 1995, there was a cessation of foreign exchange repressions and liberalisation 
of interest rates (BOZ, 2015). Consequentially, the soaring real interest rates between 1991 and 2000, 
averaging 15.5%, attracted many private investors to the government issued debt (GRZ, 1993; BOZ, 
2010). Apart from financial market liberalisation, the government also reformed its taxation systems, 
resulting in the replacement of sales tax with value-added tax in July of 1995 (GRZ, 2017). The 
government’s motive in introducing value-added tax in 1995 was to reduce inflationary pressures in the 
economy and to enhance the revenue performances of the state by minimising tax evasion (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development “OECD”, 2006).  
In the post-Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) period, domestic public debt reforms were focused 
largely on curtailing central government budget imbalances. The reforms included rationalisation of the 
civil service salary bill, integration of planning and budgeting processes, introduction of new public 
expenditures controlling frameworks, adoption of new mechanisms of selling government securities, 
and amendment of the country’s constitution, especially on public finance management and 
accountability (World Bank, 2017; Fagernas & Roberts, 2004). For instance, in 2006, the frequency of 
auctions for government securities was reduced from weekly to fortnightly for treasury bills, but was 
increased from quarterly to every two months for government bonds (BOZ, 2006). This government 
policy initiative was envisioned to enhance liquidity management by progressively moving away from 
issuing shorter-term debt securities to issuing longer-term securities. Further, to promote more efficient 
and sustainable domestic public debt levels, in 2015, the government implemented the Treasury Single 
Account (TSA) system (GRZ, 2015a). The TSA system is an integrated structure of bank accounts that 
indicates the current cash resources of the government. The purpose of instituting the TSA system was 
to boost the government’s capability to efficiently and effectively administer public financial resources 
through refining existing payments processes and eliminating unwarranted procedures (GRZ, 2015b). 
In the budget statement of 2014, the government reintroduced the cash budgeting system in an effort to 
substantially reduce domestic public debt arrears that had accumulated in recent years. In reverting to 
the cash budgeting system, beginning 2014, the government intends to lower its deficit financing 
syndrome by progressively reducing fiscal deficit to 3% of GDP by 2020 (GRZ, 2013).  
The other domestic public debt reforms in Zambia were aimed at fostering public financial discipline 
and were therefore embedded in the country’s constitution amendment – Constitution No. 2 of 2016 
(amended) – and other supplementary statutory instruments and acts. In the amended constitution, each 
stage of the budgeting process, along with the modalities surrounding the issuance of domestic public 
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debt, is guided by specific articles. For instance, the Bank of Zambia was assigned the sole 
responsibility of issuing government securities and giving financial guidance to the government of 
Zambia (Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research “ZIPAR”, 2015). Other pieces of legislature 
include the Public Finance Act. The Public Finance Act of Zambia prescribes how budget deficits will 
be financed and provides annual limits of how much the responsible minister should contract on behalf 
of the government (the Public Finance Act No. 15 of 2004 of the Laws of Zambia).  
Apart from domestic public debt reforms, the government has also, over the review period, embraced a 
series of foreign public debt restructuring exercises. The foreign public debt reforms were aimed at 
reducing external indebtedness and maintaining sustainable government debt levels. These reforms 
included the revision of foreign debt national policies to enhance effective re-engagement with 
traditional creditors; the introduction of new foreign public debt management systems, including the 
introduction of computerised financial management information systems; and the introduction of new 
institutional debt management frameworks (GRZ, 2006; 2013; IMF, 2015). In the late 1990s, the 
government of Zambia undertook joint public expenditure reviews with the World Bank, coupled with 
the implementation of the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) and the Public 
Expenditure Tracking Surveys “PETS” (Clements et al., 2003; World Bank, 2001). The objective of 
these initiatives was to improve public sector service delivery performance through the monitoring and 
tracking of foreign public debt commitments and domestic expenditures, thus helping to contain foreign 
public debt within sustainable levels.  
Other foreign public debt reforms in the post HIPC included the government’s adoption of consistent 
public debt sustainability analyses (DSA). The debt sustainability analyses were being done in 
collaboration with the IMF. The intention behind the DSA was to closely monitor the sustainability of 
foreign public debt levels and to make informed government debt decisions on prospective new 
borrowing needs of the state, debt requirements, and sources in the medium- to long-term period 
(Ministry of Finance “MOF”, 2014). In order to minimise future liquidity challenges in the post debt 
relief period, and to strengthen fiscal discipline through prudent foreign borrowing, the government 
implemented the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy “MTDS” (IMF, 2008). The MTDS is a 
policy guide that provides a framework for debt contraction, redemption and refinancing so as promote 
fiscal sustainability and stimulate economic growth. 
Foreign public debt approval and contraction in Zambia is currently guided by numerous legal statutes. 
The Constitution of Zambia No. 2 of 2016, amended; the Loans and Guarantees (Authorization) Act, 
Chapter 366 of the laws of Zambia; the Bank of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 2013, in conjunction with 
the Bank of Zambia Act of 1996, Chapter 360 of the laws of Zambia; the Local Loans Act, Chapter 353 
of the laws of Zambia; and the Public Finance Act No. 15 of 2004 of the laws of Zambia are some of the 
frameworks that help in the management of foreign public debt in Zambia in the post HIPC era (African 
Forum and Network on Debt and Development “AFRODAD”, 2005; GRZ, 2012). For instance, 
according to Part VI, Article 63 subsection two (d) of the Constitution of Zambia No. 2 of 2016, 
amended, the National Assembly shall approve foreign public debt before it is contracted (Part VI of the 
Constitution of Zambia, 2016, amended). Further, Article 207 subsection two(a) of the constitution 
states that the National Assembly shall specify and approve terms and conditions of a loan, grant, or 
guarantee (Part VI of the Constitution of Zambia, 2016, amended). The afore-described statutes were 
enacted and enforced with the prime objective of cautioning the country against external shocks arising 
from unsustainable foreign borrowings. 
The public debt reforms discussed above have significantly influenced the structure and composition of 
Zambia’s public debt during the period under review. The debt reforms also contributed to the 
considerable decrease in the country’s debt stocks. They have also enhanced the study country’s 
economic growth prospects during the review period. Presently, the country is among the Southern 
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African Development Community (SADC) countries whose overall public sector debt level is 
sustainable under the World Bank and IMF baseline scenarios (IMF, 2015). Besides sound 
macroeconomic policies and a strong public debt management framework, improved diversification of 
the export base and improved project appraisal are needed in Zambia to maintain debt sustainability, 
especially in the face of a projected rise in non-concessional borrowing and potential external financial 
and economic shocks (IMF, 2015). 
 
3. Public Debt Trends in Zambia 
The evolution of Zambia’s public debt over time was correlated with domestic factors such as policy 
failures, domestic political developments, and unexpected world economic shocks. On one hand, the 
domestic component of Zambia’s public debt came largely from treasury bills and government bonds; 
infrastructure loans; borrowings from commercial banks through loans and advances; parastatals debts; 
and accumulation of arrears on statutory liabilities such as pensions (BOZ; 2000; 2005; 2010; 2013; 
IMF, 2005a; ZIPAR, 2015). On the other hand, the foreign public debt component was a result of 
excessive non-concessional borrowing, mainly from multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, 
private banks, and export credit agencies (BOZ, 2010; IMF, 2012a; World Bank, 2015a). The non-
attractiveness of government securities in the 1990s, owing to high inflation and increased government 
payment defaults, also  motivated  the government to rely mostly on foreign borrowing (BOZ, 2015, p. 
10). 
In 1964, after attaining political independence, the Zambian government sought to attain economic 
sovereignty by setting as priority goals industrialisation and economic diversification (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa “UNECA”, 2016). In line with these objectives, the country 
embarked on a series of political, financial, social, and economic reforms with the intention of 
stimulating economic growth through increased investment flows, efficient utilisation of domestic 
resources, increased export volumes, and finding sustainable ways of reducing domestic and foreign 
public debts (Fraser & Larmer, 2010). Focus was placed on massive infrastructure development through 
extensive expansionary government policies.  
Despite the huge public sector investment in the early 1970s, exogenous factors such as the fall in world 
market prices of unrefined copper, and the global oil shocks of 1973 and 1978, increased the cost of 
imports and exacerbated macroeconomic instability (Langmead et al., 2006). Also, the massive 
nationalisation programme of the late 1960s, which the government of Zambia termed the 
“Africanisation program”, significantly increased government expenditures, thereby worsening the 
financial position of the state (Andersson et al., 2000). Consequentially, weakening terms of trade – 
especially of unrefined copper and soaring international oil prices – caused extensive balance of 
payment problems and unsustainable budget deficits in Zambia, resulting in debt financing (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development “UNCTAD”, 2012). In 1973, for instance, Zambia went 
into a loan contract with the World Bank to caution itself from the oil price shock (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2006, pp. 11-12).  
However, the government erroneously perceived the adverse developments in the domestic and world 
economy, particularly copper export prices, as temporary. It continued to maintain high levels of 
consumptive and capital expenditures, opting to finance the resultant budget disparities through local 
and foreign borrowing (Fraser & Larmer, 2010). Moreover, the various infrastructural development 
projects that were undertaken by the government in the mid-1970s, such as the opening up of the 
Tanzania-Zambia corridor, helped to accelerate the depletion of the state’s foreign reserves, forcing the 
government to opt for debt financing instead of scaling down capital costs (UNCTAD, 2011). 
Furthermore, the Zambian government’s commitment to supporting liberation struggles in the SADC 
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region between 1960 and 1980 contributed to the negative compounding effect on state revenues, 
leading to incessant reliance on deficit financing (McCulloch et al., 2004a). Subsequently, by the mid-
1980s, Zambia had plunged into a dreadful public debt crisis position, becoming one of the most highly 
indebted nations in the world (Hill & McPherson, 2004).  
From a historical standpoint, in pre- and post- independent Zambia, the mining sector (largely copper) 
was the mainspring of employment, foreign currency receipts and government income (Andersson et al., 
1989; Rakner, 2003). Hence, the twin effect of sagging world copper prices and the de-industrialisation 
course experienced by Zambia in the late 1970s until the late 1990s constrained the central 
government’s revenues from mineral taxation and exports, which declined by 82.6% from ZMK339 
million in 1974 to ZMK59 million in 1975, and further to ZMK12 million in 1976 (Organisation for 
Social Science Research for Southern and Eastern Africa “OSSREA”, 2007). During this period, the 
aggregate contribution of raw copper to export revenues exceeded 90%, whilst the general 
manufacturing sector accounted for only 6.9% (World Bank, 2015b). Thus, with reduced government 
tax revenue and export receipts, especially mineral revenue, the government had to revert to excessive 
domestic borrowing – resulting in a radical rise of domestic debt stock in nominal terms, reaching over 
ZMK566 billion in 2000 (Fagernas & Roberts, 2004; McCulloch et al., 2000a). The central bank of 
Zambia responded by issuing credit on the domestic market to finance recurrent government 
expenditures, such as the payment of civil service and the importation of fuel, and to fund work-in-
progress capital projects (Fagernas & Roberts, 2004). Thus, the substantial rise in domestic public debt 
during this period can be accredited to numerous factors, but mainly rooted in the adopted liberalisation 
policies and the continuous fall in gross government revenues – estimated to have declined by 30% 
between 1990 and 1998 (McCulloch et al., 2000b). These factors include: (1) the rolling-over policy, 
which dealt with capitalisation of the principal and interest on public domestic debt; (2) high interest 
rates, determined by the forces of demand and supply; (3) continued unsustainable government budget 
deficits; and (4) high liquidity in the banking sector (MOF, 2004). By end of 1994, Zambia was in a 
domestic public debt trap, where government expenditures were rising fast, domestic debt was 
increasing exponentially, and domestic interest rates were soaring (African Development Bank, 
“AfDB”, 2015).  
The persistently high inflation levels experienced in the Zambian economy in the late 1980s had a 
reducing effect on the real domestic public debt since they were not matched with equal adjustments in 
domestic nominal interest rates (Central Statistical Office of Zambia, 2014). The rise in central 
government’s expenditures after 2000, amid falling tax revenues, seems to have perpetuated the need for 
the government to finance itself through domestic borrowing (IMF, 2004). Additionally, the recurrent 
budget allocation overruns by the central and local governments after 2006, which were financed by 
domestic credit, aggravated the domestic public debt dynamics in Zambia.  
According to the central bank, despite the auction system of treasury bill introduced in 1993 and 1995, 
the secondary market for Zambia’s government securities remained underdeveloped and narrow, 
characterised by few government liabilities with parastatals (BOZ, 2015). Henceforth, the raised credit 
repeatedly fell short of the state’s financial needs, compelling the government to rely on foreign 
borrowing, mainly from multilateral and bilateral financial organisations – mostly the World Bank, 
IMF, and the Paris Club (BOZ, 2012). Foreign public borrowing grew from the moderately low levels 
of US$3.8 million between 1975 and 1984 to approximately US$7.3 billion in 2004, representing a 
187% increase (SADC, 2010). The period from 1970 to 2000 can be described as ‘foreign debt-led’ in 
the sense that Zambia ran a persistent current account deficit and borrowed significantly from global 
financial institutions and world capital markets to finance the fiscal gap. For instance, in the five-year 
period between 1975 and 1980, Zambia’s foreign public debt increased nearly threefold, from US$1137 
million to US$3366 million, respectively (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
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“SIDA”, 1989). According to SIDA (2003), Zambia’s total foreign public debt had further increased to 
US$7.3 billion by 1991, with most debt measurement variables deteriorating to unprecedented levels.  
By 1992, Zambia’s foreign government debt had reached alarming levels, which prompted some 
creditors, such as the Paris Club, to cancel part of the debt owed to them by this country. In 1996, the 
Bretton Woods institutions introduced the HIPC initiative, targeting developing countries in serious debt 
challenges (IMF, 2001). In December 2000, Zambia’s foreign public debt was at least double its GDP. 
Fortunately, the Bretton Woods institutions agreed that Zambia had reached the Decision Point of the 
HIPC initiative (IMF and the International Development Agency “IDA”, 2001). During the interim 
period, between decision and completion points, Zambia received foreign public debt cancellation 
amounting to US$452 million and US$98 million from the IMF and IDA, respectively (IMF, 2005b). 
Other creditors that extended debt relief to Zambia between 2000 and 2005 were the Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development, the AfDB, the European 
Union (EU), and the Paris Club (UNDP, 2006).  
In April 2005, Zambia reached the HIPC Completion Point, and it received remarkable foreign public 
debt relief from the Group of Eight (G8) countries, Paris Club, and other creditors (GRZ, 2006b; 2015). 
The debt relief was in the form of foreign public debt stock cancellation and rescheduling. A total of 
US$3.8 billion foreign public debt was cancelled, reducing accumulated foreign public debt from 
US$7.3 billion in 2004 to US$4.5 billion by December 2005 (GRZ, 2010). The foreign public debt 
burden was further reduced in 2006, when the Bretton Woods institutions and the African Development 
Fund (AfDF) decided to wholly cancel the debts owed to them by Zambia under the Enhanced HIPC 
initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative “MDRI” (GRZ, 2006b; MOF, 2006). The 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative was a redefined and deepened edition of HIPC.  
In January 2006, the IMF wrote-off US$581.6 million, representing 97% of the value of debt owed to it 
by Zambia (GRZ, 2008). Consequently, the MDRI reduced Zambia’s debt by a further US$2 billion to 
US$2.5 billion by the end of 2006 (World Bank, 2014). Figure 1 shows the trends in public debt growth 
in Zambia during the period from 1980 to 2015.  
 
 
Figure 1. Public Debt Trends in Zambia (1980-2015) 
Source: World Bank (2012; 2015) 
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In Figure 1, two distinct episodes of public debt to GDP growth in Zambia can be established. The first 
episode is from 1980 to 2004, in which Zambia’s public debt was exceptionally higher than GDP.  
During this period, the recurrent budget was largely financed by monetised domestic revenue and 
domestic borrowing, with more than 80% of the capital budget financed from foreign borrowings 
(Fagernas & Roberts, 2004). Apart from accumulating interests on public debt, the deterioration in real 
fiscal resources between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s brought about substantial declines in most 
economic and social categories of expenditure (World Bank, 2012). Contrary, however, the cumulative 
effect of rising aid inflows, debt relief initiatives and the stabilisation of the domestic economy, 
culminated into marginal reduction in public debt growth rates in the late 1990s. Also, a combination of 
the new government’s revenue and spending reforms, which helped to curb public expenditure, and the 
commencement of domestic public debt redemption through the help of an increased level of 
concessional foreign public borrowing, contributed to the marginal decline in debt-GDP ratio – although 
it remained above 100% (Fagernas & Roberts, 2004). The persistently high levels of inflation, averaging 
118%, recorded during the period of 1984 to 2004 also had a compounding effect on the nominal value 
of public debt (World Bank, 2015c). Similar to other indebted countries, the period from 1980 to 2004 
was characterised by the exceptional burden of foreign public debt arising from debt interest payment 
defaults, which reached approximately US$3 billion by 2004 (UNDP, 2006, p. 11). From a backward-
looking perspective, the high levels of public debt between 1980 and 2000 were associated with lower 
and volatile growth rates, averaging 0.95% (Chirwa & Odhiambo, 2016). 
The second episode defines the period after the debt relief of 2005 and 2006. This phase is characterised 
by public debt levels that were below the national gross output. The low ratio of government debt-to-
GDP of less than 50% was a result of a combination of debt relief initiatives and a series of government 
financial reforms that were implemented in 2005 and thereafter. The reforms were aimed at enhancing 
effective public debt and government expenditure management. 
Despite high growth rates averaging 5.6% between 2000 and 2014 (World Bank, 2012; 2015), the 
government relied more on borrowed funds to finance its programmes due to a combination of low 
domestic tax revenues and increasing infrastructural development expenditures (UNECA, 2016).  The 
rising trend in Zambia’s public debt relative to GDP after 2010 was due to a drastic increase in 
government borrowing, domestic and foreign, to fund protracted public sector investments, owing to the 
government’s priority to transform the country into a middle-income country by 2030 (MOF, 2006). 
Although the Fifth National Development Plan had prescribed a maximum limit of not more than 0.5% 
of GDP on domestic public borrowing, the Zambian government exceeded it by 2% in 2013 due to a 
number of reasons. These include a sizeable amount of carryover funds, an expansionary monetary 
policy, and an increase in the issuance of long-term public sector securities (BOZ, 2016). Accordingly, 
an analysis of Zambia’s public debt reveals an upward trend in the post-Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
initiative era. Table 1 provides a summary of the Bretton woods institution’s loans to Zambia between 
1970 and 2005. 
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Table 1. Summary of the Bretton Woods Institution’s Loans to Zambia between 1970 and 2005 
Year Loan Description 
1973 The World Bank disbursed the requested by the Zambian government following the global oil price 
shock. 
1978 The World Bank, through the International Development Association, extended new loans to Zambia. 
1981 The IMF, made some loan disbursements to Zambia under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). 
1982 The IMF cancelled the EFF. 
1983 The World Bank stopped making new loan and aid disbursements to Zambia. 
1984 The World Bank agreed to give Zambia a new loan towards the resuscitation and development of the 
Copper Sector. 
1985 The Bretton Woods institutions made some Structural Adjustment Programme loans disbursements to 
Zambia. 
1987 The Zambian government cancelled all Bretton Woods sponsored reform programmes. The IMF and 
the World Bank suspends financial aid and loans to Zambia. 
1992 The Zambian government clears loan arrears to the World Bank. The IMF started to make some new 
loan disbursements. 
1995 The IMF and Zambian government signed a new loan of US$1.3 billion under the 3 year Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and 1-year Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF).  Also in 1995, 
the World Bank issued new loans to Zambia under the Economic Recovery and Investment Project. 
1999 The IMF disburses part of the $350 million loan under the extended ESAF. 
2000 Zambia reached the IMF and the World Bank HIPC Decision Point. As a result, Zambia received 
partial foreign public debt relief. 
2004 Through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the IMF made new loans to Zambia, to the tune of 
US$320 million. 
2005 Zambia reached the IMF/World Bank HIPC completion Point and received enormous debt relief from 
the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Source: GRZ (2006a; 2006b); IMF (2001; 2005a) 
 
4. Challenges Faced in Public Debt Management in Zambia 
Notwithstanding the existence of several government debt management statutes and strategies, some of 
the challenges faced by the government of Zambia are: (1) the lack of a comprehensive long-term plan 
or institutional arrangements to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies; and (2) the absence of public 
debt analysis methodology to ensure that government debt is kept within sustainable levels and that 
risks associated with future public borrowing are well calculated and known (BOZ, 2015b). 
Zambia’s current legal and administrative system on public debt is fraught with loose ends, which 
include duplication of or overlapping functions and the absence of clear borrowing limits to all 
government arms and associated institutions (AFRODAD, 2010). For instance, whereas the General 
Loan and Stock Act, Chapter 350 of the laws of Zambia empowers the central bank to administer 
government securities that were publicly issued, this law also allocates the mandate of registering 
government securities to the national treasury (GRZ, 2012). Also, whereas the law provides the 
maximum borrowing limit for the central government, it is silent about this issue for local governments 
and other arms of the government, except when requesting guarantees (AFRODAD, 2012). 
Additionally, according to AFRODAD (2012), there currently are no clear statutes to govern the 
approval of guarantees from the Ministry of Finance.  
There is also potential for conflict between debt issuance for monetary and fiscal policy objectives since 
government domestic debt issuance directly affects the domestic capital market through the establishing 
of benchmark prices, which also impact on financial sector stability and growth and, hence, affect the 
effectiveness of monetary transmission mechanisms (World Bank, 2015b). In other words, government 
issuance of domestic debt can restrain the options open to monetary policy authorities, and vice versa. 
Even with prescribed limits on domestic public borrowing, the maturity structure of government debt 
   
E u r o E c o n o m i c a  
Issue 3(37)/2018                                                                                                    ISSN: 1582-8859 
FINANCE, BANKING AND ACCOUNTING  
50 
securities can directly affect the shape of the yield curve and thus influence the operations of monetary 
authorities (World Bank, 2015b). 
According to the Bank of Zambia (2015, p. 7), the absence of a proper government debt management 
framework, weak fiscal performance, exchange rate instability and high inflationary pressures in the 
1980s and 1990s contributed to unsustainable domestic public debt levels. During this period, the 
government failed to effectively monitor and control the expenditures of its line ministries in line with 
the stipulated financial rules and regulations, leading to huge fiscal deficits (World Bank, 2005, p. 3). 
Consequently, the government was compelled to borrow additional financial resources to finance its 
budget. Moreover, the domestic market for government securities in Zambia is still narrow, and the 
treasury securities are dominated by the banking sector – mainly commercial banks (OECD, 2010; 
2014). The challenge with this arrangement is that commercial banks should match short-term liability 
deposits with short-term treasury bills, thus depressing the full development of the government bond 
market (OECD, 2007). The dominance of the banking sector in government securities also reflects 
weaknesses in the commercial lending operations (OECD, 2007).  
Although in 2012 the government issued Eurobonds, which possibly attracted foreign investors to the 
government securities, there are still challenges associated with the development of more long-term 
domestic public debt instruments that attract potential investors (IMF, 2014a). Domestic debt of 
between two and three years makes the government extremely susceptible to short-term maturity 
securities and refinancing vulnerabilities given the volatility of inflation and world interest rates (IMF, 
2014b). Also, since the market for government securities is still underdeveloped, it is difficult and costly 
to introduce tax incentives to promote the demand for treasury bills and government bonds in Zambia 
(OECD, 2010). While non-resident holders of government bonds are typically low, their presence 
increases volatility, meaning that Zambia’s domestic markets can be hit by exogenous shocks (OECD, 
2014).  
The other challenge that is making domestic public debt management difficult in Zambia is that local 
governments (municipal councils) are not involved in the overall national debt management strategy 
formulation (AFRODAD, 2012). The implication, according to AFRODAD, is that local councils end 
up making too many financial demands on the central government, leading to continuous fiscal deficits, 
which ultimately lead to either domestic or foreign public borrowing. This challenge can be alleviated 
by inclusive policy and strategy making, where local governments are involved in shaping of national 
policies that affect them. In addition, local governments can be made to seek adequate approval from the 
central government so as to ensure that their borrowing conforms to the national developmental 
objectives.  
Pertaining to the powers to borrow, the Local Loans Act authorises the president and/or the minister 
responsible for finance to acquire funds in the domestic financial markets through the issuance of 
specified government securities, that is, bonds and debentures (GRZ, 2016; ZIPAR, 2015). The 
president is permitted to issue a warranty without an appropriation act or approval from the parliament, 
an instance which brought about unconstitutional excess expenditures (World Bank, 2005: 1). Thus, the 
clause actually makes both government expenditure management and domestic public debt control 
highly difficulty and unmanageable (World Bank, 2005).  
Although Zambia has explicit statutory measures governing the contracting and servicing of foreign 
public debt, the framework is not always adequately implemented and is poorly harmonised (IMF, 2015, 
p. 9). For example, the Loans and Guarantees Act of the laws of Zambia is only limited to the 
contraction, and not reporting, of foreign public debt. Hence, there are no proper foreign public debt 
management guidelines regarding the types of foreign public debt reports to be produced by either the 
central bank or the Ministry of Finance (IMF, 2012b). Also, since the President’s Office has exclusive 
control over national foreign debt contraction, this arrangement may actually make the control of 
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foreign debt difficult in addition to fostering abuse of national financial resources (AFRODAD, 2011: 
27).  
Furthermore, the management of foreign public debt is constrained by the weak institutional 
arrangements in the country, resulting in duplication or overlapping of functions between government 
authorities, especially the central bank and the Ministry of Finance (Macroeconomic and Financial 
Management Institute “MEFMI”, 2007, p. 23). Other challenges associated with foreign public debt 
management in Zambia include the absence of clearly set out foreign public borrowing limits to local 
government authorities and the lack of foreign public borrowing thresholds, like public debt/GDP ratio, 
interest paid/ GDP ratio, and interest paid/tax revenue ratio, which are fundamental principles for 
foreign public debt management (World Bank, 2013). The Zambian government should also set out 
commitment control rules while empowering the Ministry of Finance to undertake foreign public debt 
audits in local municipalities - government’s main sources of public guaranteed debt – which are 
currently non-existent (Office of the Audit General, Zambia, 2011, p. 21).  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the dynamics of both domestic and foreign public debt in Zambia from 1964 to 
2015. The highlighted debt management reforms were in the form of legal, institutional, and 
administration frameworks, as well as contractual agreements with major foreign creditors such as the 
IMF, World Bank, and the Paris Club. The paper revealed that between 1970 and 1999, adverse 
developments in the domestic and world economies prompted massive public borrowing, both 
domestically and externally. Consequently, beginning the late 1980s, Zambia was in a severe public 
debt crisis, compelling the government to embark on a multiplicity of economic and financial reforms. 
The reforms were aimed at reducing the country’s indebtedness and also reviving the country’s 
economic fortunes. Also discussed in the paper is the considerable rise in the country’s public debt after 
2012, being caused by new non-concessional loans and the issuance of Eurobonds – resulting in an 
increased threat of high repayment obligations by 2020. High nominal interest rates, insistent economic 
crises and lack of clear institutional arrangements to coordinate and synchronise government debt were 
some of the identified debt management challenges discussed in the paper. To ensure future 
sustainability of public debt, the paper recommends that the government: (1) limits both domestic and 
foreign borrowing to reduce high interest payments on debt in future; (2) aligns its infrastructure 
expenditures with domestic revenues to ensure budget sustainability; (3) implements and adheres to 
cash budgeting system to control fiscal deficits; and (4) expands its domestic revenue base by 
diversifying the economy and promoting massive industrialisation. 
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